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The State of Israel is fighting terrorism which has been trying to undermine the foundations of its sovereignty since its establishment in 1948. Over the years, Israel tried to make peace with its enemies while continuing to fight simultaneously for independence. The Israeli -Palestinian conflict is perhaps the most intensive struggle of all. In recent years, a dialogue process began between the parties. This dialogue was supposed to set the permanent situation between the parties. Since then, the first and second intifada broke out and negotiations between the parties continued while the I.D.F conducting its counter-terrorism campaign.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the role of the military and the strategy that is required to conduct a counter-terrorism campaign while negotiating peace. The essay will examine the historical processes, key events and milestones that have affected negotiations from a military perspective; it will specify the dilemmas facing military leaders; and analyze the special military -political relationship. All in order to examine their efficiency and offer an alternative strategy that supports and serves the Israeli national policy.
HOW TO MAINTAIN A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERROR COMPAIGN WHILE NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE
The Israeli -Palestinian conflict, at the center of the Israeli national security discourse, has wide implications for Israel's security. Despite the fact that this is not a classic case of "hard power" that threatens the very existence of Israel, it is a sensitive and much debated political issue in Israel. Palestinian's "soft power" and their ability to destabilize the regional stability dynamics is a matter of deep concern for Israel. The If we examine the conflict with the Palestinians, we can see that the characteristics of the enemy changed in accordance with the political situation, to a point it was difficult to understand who the enemy actually was. In certain periods, the Palestinian security forces were allies and operated in full cooperation with IDF, in other instances they stood by and did not prevent certain terrorist acts, and in certain periods they became the enemy turning their weapon against IDF soldiers 13 The second challenge is the regulation of relations between the military and the political echelons. In traditional wars, dialog is simple. The political echelon orders the military to win the war and after achieving victory or truce, the political process will begin. Even if victory is not simple, its definition is clear. In these wars, there is an authorized system by the state to manage the termination of the conflict. On the other hand, when the enemy is an organization, the delineation of the problem covers up the boundaries of time, place and possible achievements in the struggle. In these limited conflicts, it is hard to define political objectives and to translate them into military missions. As a result, a different kind of dialogue between the military and political echelon is required, not just hierarchical dialogue where the political echelon directs and the military executes. The fourth challenge is the technological challenge and its nature in matching ability and means developed for a traditional war to an asymmetric-limited war.
Therefore, this requires technology matching in the war against terror organizations.
The adjustment is not only technical but also conceptual.
The fifth challenge is the proper use of the media. One of the important dimensions in all types of wars is international and public legitimacy. This dimension has a direct effect on freedom of action, the time in which you can operate and a variety of means that can be used. The legitimacy is influenced by the image of reality that is created in the media and not necessarily from reality itself.
The sixth challenge is the gap remaining between the levels of expectation to the ability to fulfill them. In asymmetrical wars, a large gap exists between the expectations of public opinion, politicians and press to the security forces' ability to realize them. The gap is expressed in terms of duration of war. What is the required time for a large, strong and progressive army as the IDF to defeat hundreds or thousands of terrorists?
For the number of casualties on both sides (with an emphasis on the innocent) -after all asymmetric wars are usually defined as "wars of choice " and therefore the cost of human lives is accordingly high. Also the ability to achieve total victory (by definition of traditional war) -the public and politicians are willing to pay a price in every war and under the conditions that at the end we will achieve a clear and absolute victory. This definition of victory is complicated mainly when there is an asymmetric definition between the disputed parties. Usually the State will define victory as a decision whereas the terror organization will define it as survival For years, Israel looked at Hamas through the narrow prism of a terrorist organization, but its dependence on the public made the organization to subordinate terrorist attacks on public opinion. As long as the Palestinian public believed that its national aspirations would be fulfilled through the political process, it did not give legitimacy to terrorism. The third variable is, as stated, the Palestinian Authority's position in relation to terrorism. Palestinian security forces also are attentive to public opinion and act accordingly to thwart terrorism. As to public opinion, the belief of security services is that as long as the war against terrorism and Hamas members will lead them to an independent state, they will continue the same route, but once they lose confidence in the process, fighting against terrorism will cease. Therefore, it is required to match the echelon relations model to the type of war we are faced with and supposed to deal with 16 As I described the changes in the nature of war in terms of intensity, for the sake of simplicity, I will now define a rough classification of types of warfare. The first type is a high intensity conflict, or in other words, the conventional war that characterized The overall response to this complex problem should be based on a number of principles:
1. Instead of using the term deterrence, that is not relevant in the face of this type of threat, we must act to achieve attrition (see Figure 2) . Attrition means continuous pressure on the opponent in all areas and possible means for a period of time while focusing on the armed groups and much less on the general population, because it cannot pressure and deter the radicals in the midst. It is best that the pressure should be free of all negotiations, except for temporary tactical purposes. The advantage of attrition is that it does not allow, or at least slows the learning process of the opponent, In 2006, the IDF Central Command initiated a campaign against Hamas. The campaign was initiated due to the understanding that the Hamas movement was not only a terrorist organization trying to achieve its goals through terrorist acts committed by its military wing; but that the organization operated as a hybrid system (as indicated before), and that actual damage to the movement would be possible through attacking its political institutions, financial and sermonizing system, and charity institutions that directly support the terrorist activities of the movement. The campaign required an interagency effort in order to understand the way in which the organization operated and a plan to create sufficient targets against Hamas.
The planning approach performed by the Central Command, consisted of analyzing the operational environment, defining operational objectives and eventually identifying numerous targets which were submitted to the six regional brigades in the West Bank. This approach created a reality in which, within a short period, many infrastructures of the Hamas organization were damaged, including operational activists arrests, detention of money changers, shutting down charitable institutions and businesses and confiscation of equipment that was used to support the organization's activities.
After less than a year, the government ordered a halt to the campaign due to the pressures of the Palestinian Authority (led by the Fatah movement) and the international community due to second and third order effects of the operation. These implications of the damage that was caused to the Palestinian economy, the population which was supported by these institutions and damaging the Palestinian Authority, which was perceived as collaborators with Israel against the Palestinian people, were not taken into account while planning the campaign and not properly analyzed during the overall assessment performed during the operational planning. In fact, the Palestinian public that was hurt as a result of this operation found themselves standing alongside the Hamas movement and against the Palestinian Authority.
Using the design approach could have allowed the Central Command to frame the operational environment and try to answer the questions as to the tendency and the "alternative future environments that those opposing us may desire, so we can consider this in developing an operational approach that will not only meet our endstate, but preclude the undesirable aspects of the opposing endstate"
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. In this case, using the design approach could have enabled the Central Command to understand the consequences expected from the possible course of action against the organization and its implications on the population and the Palestinian Authority and not just the consequences related to the operational environment and the organization's ability to carry out terrorist acts. In addition, the design approach will allow reframing of the problem, "which focus heavily on progress towards a selected end state and uses assessment as a tool to inform a response and reactions to current condition. The campaign that the State of Israel is conducting against terrorism, especially the Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza, and the operational environment
